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INTRODUCTION
In his Article “Sex in the City,” Professor Sean Hannon Williams
addresses the problems of enormous trial court discretion and
concomitant unpredictable and inconsistent decisions found in
divorce cases by proposing that local governments adopt nonbinding
“rules of thumb” that would guide judges in exercising that discretion
with respect to issues such as child custody, property division, and
income support.1 He contends that this proposal would fit within the
existing legal framework of state-local relations and would advance
the goals of both family law reform and local empowerment with
respect to family issues.2 Specifically, he urges that local legislative
action could be a significant step towards the “rulification” reform
that state legislatures have so far been unable to achieve, while also
serving as a springboard for greater local government participation in
a range of issues relevant to family welfare.3 It is an intriguing
proposal. My comment focuses on two issues: (i) local power to act

*

Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of
Law.
1. Sean Hannon Williams, Sex in the City, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1107, 1111
(2016).
2. See id. at 1110-12.
3. See id. at 1123.

1175

1176

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

on family law matters, specifically the consequences of divorce; and
(ii) the appropriate role for local legislative bodies in addressing these
issues.
I. FAMILY LAW LOCALISM: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
As Professor Williams explains, family law localism presents two
distinct but overlapping questions—whether there is local power to
act in the first place, and whether, even if in theory a local
government has power to legislate on the subject, it has the further
power to prevent state preemption of the local measure.4 These are
sometimes referred to as the powers of initiative and immunity, or the
sword and the shield.5 The two issues overlap because, as is often the
case, if the relevant state constitutional or statutory provisions are
unclear, courts tend to turn to similar criteria—the costs and benefits
of statewide uniformity versus local variation; external effects of local
actions; history; and relative institutional capacity—for both
questions.6 The two issues are different, though, because there are
many matters that are “local enough” that a local government may
have power to address them in the first instance, but that are also
“state enough” that the state can displace local action.
A. Local Initiative
Starting with local power to act, the general background norm in
the United States is Dillon’s Rule, which provides that a local
government possesses only those powers (i) expressly delegated to it
by the state, (ii) necessarily implied in or incident to the express
delegation, or (iii) essential to accomplish the expressly delegated
powers.7 Although Dillon’s Rule has been supplanted by home rule
for most cities and some counties in many states,8 it remains the
governing principle wherever home rule has not been provided.9
4. See id. at 1135.
5. See, e.g., RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 346-432 (8th ed. 2016).
6. See id.
7. See id. at 327.
8. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (criticizing
Dillon’s Rule as “antithetical to effective and efficient local and state government.”).
9. See, e.g., Hugh Spitzer, “Home Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington
Cities, 38 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 809, 856 (2015) (noting that although the state
constitution and statutes vest home rule powers in many Washington cities,
“Washington should be considered a ‘Dillon’s Rule state’ for its special purpose
districts, non-charter counties, and the state’s nine non-code cities and sixty-nine
towns”).
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Virginia, for example, remains a Dillon’s Rule state, and, as a result,
tends to read local regulatory powers narrowly,10 and Dillon’s Rule
continues to be invoked in many other states, including recent
examples in Illinois,11 South Dakota,12 and Vermont.13 For a Dillon’s
Rule city or county, any local powers with respect to family law are
likely to be closely cabined to the authority expressly granted by the
state. Thus, in Virginia, the state supreme court concluded that the
state law authorizing counties to provide the dependents of county
employees with health benefits did not give the county authority to
provide dependent benefits to the unmarried domestic partners of
county employees, even though the benefits were funded solely by the
county.14
Many states provide some cities and counties with a broader grant
of power to act over a range of issues without having to obtain
specific state authorization. This is known as home rule.15 Home rule
can result from a state constitutional amendment, state legislation, or
even from expansive state judicial interpretation of legislative
grants.16 Home rule classically takes two forms. Early versions of
home rule, dating back to the late nineteenth century, sought to
provide municipalities with both authority to take action and
protection from state displacement in the area of “local” or
“municipal” affairs.17 In other words, this type of home rule
combined initiative with immunity. Building off a United States
Supreme Court reference to such an early home rule measure as
creating an “imperium in imperio,”18 this is known as imperio home

10. See, e.g., Marble Tech., Inc. v. City of Hampton, 690 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 2010)
(holding in absence of express or implied grant of authority from state legislature,
locality may not use certain criteria in designating a resource protection area); Bd. of
Zoning Appeals v. Bd. of Supervisors, 666 S.E.2d 315 (Va. 2008) (holding in absence
of specific grant of authority, zoning appeals board lacks power to bring declaratory
judgment action); Bd. of Supervisors of Augusta Co. v. Countryside Inv. Co., 522
S.E.2d 610 (Va. 1999) (holding state law allowing counties to impose requirements
for subdivision of land did not authorize denial of subdivision approval on basis that
development would destroy county’s rural environment).
11. See, e.g., Tri-Power Res. Inc. v. City of Carlisle, 967 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2012) (non-home-rule municipalities in Illinois are subject to Dillon’s Rule).
12. See, e.g., Olesen v. Town of Hurley, 691 N.W.2d 324, 328-29 (S.D. 2004)
(holding state law authorizing municipalities to operate bars that sell alcohol by the
drink “does not imply a necessary power” to offer meals at such a bar).
13. See, e.g., City of Montpelier v. Barnett, 49 A.3d 120, 127-29 (Vt. 2012).
14. See Arlington Co. v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2001).
15. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 346.
16. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980).
17. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 346-47.
18. City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893).
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rule.19 Although providing locally-initiated measures with immunity
from state displacement should have created a powerful foundation
for local autonomy, in practice state courts were reluctant to
immunize local actions from state regulation.20 As a result, the notion
of “local” or “municipal” affairs often received narrow
interpretations in both the initiative and immunity settings. In
response, in the mid-twentieth century local autonomy advocates
developed a new home rule form that sought to strengthen local
initiative power at the price of relinquishing local immunity claims.
Known as “legislative home rule,” this type of home rule provides
that a home rule local government can exercise all legislative powers
that the state could delegate unless and until a power is taken back by
the state.21 Most modern home rule enactments have been of the
legislative form, although in practice some state constitutions blur
these theoretically sharp distinctions and use a mix of both imperio
and legislative language.22
Under legislative home rule, most contested issues are preemption
questions rather than local-power-to-act-in-the-first-place issues,
which would provide some support for family law localism, at least in
the first instance. However, some legislative home rule provisions
contain a further qualification, based on a proviso in the National
Municipal League’s model home rule amendment, that the broad
delegation of powers “shall not include the power to enact private or
civil laws governing civil relationships except as incident to the
exercise of an independent power.”23 This idea that regulating
“private or civil law governing civil law relationships” is inherently
beyond the scope of local power is an old one, and was part of the
analysis of local or municipal affairs in imperio states.24 Although an
obviously vague concept, it almost surely encompasses family law,
including the consequences of divorce. The two most quoted dicta
concerning this phrase were uttered by Benjamin Cardozo, when he
was chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, and Chief Judge
Arthur Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court. According to
Chief Judge Cardozo:
There are other affairs exclusively those of the state, such as the law
of domestic relations, of wills, of inheritance, of contracts, of crimes
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 347.
See, e.g., id. at 347-48.
See, e.g., id. at 348.
See, e.g., id. at 348-50.
See, e.g., id. at 364-75.
See, e.g., id. at 372-75.
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not necessarily local (for example, larceny or forgery), the
organization of courts, the procedure therein. None of these things
can be said to touch the affairs that a city is organized to regulate,
whether we have reference to history or to tradition or to the
existing forms of charters.25

Relying on Cardozo’s statement, Chief Judge Vanderbilt observed:
Provisions for home rule have not given omnipotence to local
governments. Matters that because of their nature are inherently
reserved for the State alone and among which have been the master
and servant and landlord and tenant relationships, matters of
descent, the administration of estates, creditors’ rights, domestic
relations, and many others of general and statewide significance, are
not proper subjects for local treatment under the authority of the
general statutes. The broad grant of power . . . relates to matters of
local concern . . . not to those matters involving state policy or in the
realm of affairs of general public interest and applicability . . . The
limitation upon legislative power is in the subject itself, and not in
the nature or character of the political subdivision to which the grant
is made.26

To be sure, as Professor Williams has observed,27 many local
government actions can affect common law private or civil
relationships. Local housing codes can be considered by courts in
landlord-tenant disputes, local zoning ordinances can influence the
resolution of nuisance cases, and local consumer protection or antidiscrimination measures can play a role in determining the outcome
of other tort actions.28 So, too, the exception to the limitation on
local power to enact laws governing civil relationships for measures
“incident to an exercise of an independent” local power could provide
authorization for local laws grounded in the grant of police power to
promote the local general welfare—such as the well-being of children
affected by divorce—that “incidentally” affect private or civil

25. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (N.Y. 1929) (emphasis added).
26. Wagner v. Mayor & Council of Newark, 132 A.2d 794, 800-01 (N.J. 1957)
(quoting Paul v. Gloucester Co., 50 N.J.L. 585, 601-02 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888)
(emphasis supplied).
27. See Williams, supra note 1, at 1143.
28. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 1109 (2012); Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law
Exception, 20 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1973). But see McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570
A.2d 834 (Md. 1990) (invalidating local employment discrimination ordinance);
Bannerman v. City of Fall River, 461 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1984) (invalidating local
regulation of the conversion of rental units to condominiums on private/civil
relationships grounds).
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relationships.29 Still, the concept of “incidental” may be key; local
measures intended to directly influence the determination of statelaw rights, such as those of divorcing marital partners with respect to
their children, property, and ongoing post-divorce obligations in state
civil litigation, may go to the heart of the private/civil law limitation
on local power to act.30 Perhaps the safest thing to say is that given
the vagueness of both the private/civil law limitation and the incidentto-independent-power exception to the limitation, it is uncertain how
this restriction would affect family law localism, but it certainly means
that the question of local power to act in the first instance is pretty far
from open and shut.
To recap, in the absence of an express state grant, local power to
act on family law matters is unlikely to exist for local governments
subject to Dillon’s Rule. However, it could exist in home rule
jurisdictions, particularly in legislative home rule states that do not
impose the private/civil law limitation. In those states the question
would be whether these are matters that could be delegated to local
governments. Given that these are matters that affect the welfare of
local residents, I assume the answer would be “yes, they are
delegable” and, thus, presumed delegated. In imperio states, the
question would be whether these issues—such as child custody,
property settlements, alimony and support—are local/municipal
matters. That is a more difficult question because although these
matters surely affect local residents, they are also matters of state
concern and historically have been treated as such.
Professor Williams argues that one of the traditional arguments
against local action—the value of statewide uniformity—is
undermined in the divorce context because of the currently openended nature of state standards and the resulting disuniformity in trial
court decision-making.31 He may be right about that. On the other
hand, I think he greatly understates the significance of the concern
about the external effects of local actions, specifically, the impact that
local rules will have on people outside the local jurisdiction, such as
when a member of a divorcing couple moves away from the city
29. New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding local living wage ordinances regulates private relationships but is
authorized by home rule grant as incidental to the local power to promote the general
welfare of local employees).
30. Cf. Diller, supra note 28, at 1129-34, 1162-67 (arguing that the main effect of
the private/civil law exception is to limit the ability of localities to authorize private
citizens to bring private civil litigation to enforce local regulations of private
behavior).
31. Williams, supra note 1, at 1115-17.
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whose local law was initially applied, possibly taking the children. He
summarily notes “this is not generally seen as a problem in the
interstate context.”32 But what may not be a problem in dealing with
just fifty states could become one when dealing with thousands of
municipalities. Multiple, varying local building, housing, and zoning
codes within a state are feasible because they apply to properties that
stay put within the regulating jurisdiction. But applying different
intrastate rules to people who can move around a state could cause
burdensome legal complications.
Probably the strongest argument for Professor Williams’s version
of family law localism is the nature of the local laws that he proposes.
By urging only local “rules of thumb” which would function as
nonbinding norms that courts would have to consider but need not
apply, he may be avoiding the uncertain legal status of local
regulation of private or civil relationships by eschewing regulation.
Like local challenges to the Patriot Act or declarations of nuclear-free
zones,33 these would be local expressions of views rather than laws,
albeit articulated like laws through the official medium of a city
council enactment. By falling below the level of laws and purporting
not to bind, they might be consistent with even a relatively restricted
definition of local power to act.
B. Preemption
Finding that a locality has power to act is only the first step in the
determination of whether a local measure of a subject is valid. With
the relatively rare exception of matters in imperio states in which
local regulation is protected from state displacement, most local
measures are subject to preemption by state law.34 Preemption will
occur when state law forbids local action on a subject, the local law is
in conflict with state regulation, or state regulation is so pervasive that
the state is said to “occupy the field” to the exclusion of local
regulation.35 Professor Williams asserts that “state statutes that
control alimony, child custody, and other family law matters do not
contain express provisions preempting local law.”36 I will defer to
him on that claim, observing only that the lack of express preemption
is almost surely due to the assumption that this is an area in which

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1141.
See id. at 1111-12, 1124.
See generally BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 432-94.
See generally id. at 432-94.
Williams, supra note 1, at 1144.
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there is no local power to act in the first place, thus rendering express
preemption language unnecessary. The real issues, then, are conflict
and field preemption.
As Professor Williams indicates, whether a local measure would be
preempted on conflict or field theories would turn on what a state’s
law actually says. If state law lays out the factors for a court to
consider in making a judgment on an issue like custody or visitation
or support, then a local effort to add criteria – even nonbinding rules
of thumb – could very well be preempted. On a conflict analysis, the
decision would turn on whether the state’s law would be treated as a
floor— “at least these criteria must be considered, but the court may
consider additional criteria”—or as a floor and a ceiling – “these
criteria must and only these criteria may be considered.”37 On the one
hand, as long as the local criteria are not themselves inconsistent with
the state-listed criteria, there is arguably no conflict and the locallygenerated criteria could be added to the court’s consideration. On the
other hand, the mere fact of adding new criteria means that the statelisted criteria may be given less weight. The factors going into a
court’s determination of whether this is an appropriate area for local
action in the first place could also influence its judgment as to
whether the locally-added factors legitimately supplement or
illegitimately crowd out the state’s factors. Given the state’s
traditional control of family law, the likelihood of a finding of field
preemption is even stronger than conflict preemption.
But if, as Professor Williams contends, state law is more openended and “invites judges to consider any other relevant factor” in
addition to those specifically listed,38 then there would be no conflict
preemption and probably no field preemption either. However, even
with an “any other relevant factor” state law, the local government
could not compel the state court to consider the factors the locality
proposes. It would be up to the court to decide whether as a matter of
state law a local legislature’s enactment of a family law resolution
makes the content of that resolution relevant to the court’s
disposition of the issue which is the subject of the resolution. The fact
that a local government has authority to pass a resolution on a subject
does not mean it can bind a state court’s determination of whether
the local government’s position is relevant to the legal issue. The
court would have to consider the appropriate role of local legislative
bodies in the resolution of family law questions.
37. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, at 469-71 (discussing the role of
floors and ceilings in preemption analysis).
38. Williams, supra note 1, at 1144.
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II. THE PLACE OF LOCAL LEGISLATURES IN RESOLVING FAMILY
LAW DISPUTES
The place of local legislative bodies in the resolution of family law
disputes involves separate consideration of the role of the local and
the role of the legislature. Professor Williams focuses on some of the
principal theoretical arguments for decentralization—the possibility
of experimentation, openness to policy entrepreneurship, and the
incentive for local political participation.39 Interestingly, he rejects
“efficient sorting” as a justification for his proposal, even though, as
he acknowledges, it is “a classic argument”40 for local decisionmaking. Efficient sorting is the idea that different people in different
local areas have different policy preferences, so that decentralization
which permits local policies to match the preferences of local
majorities will make more people happy than higher level decisionmaking which will impose a rule that the overall majority favors but
local majorities oppose. The sorting argument is a critical one for
localism. If each city were a perfect microcosm of the state as a
whole, with the same division of opinion, then local policy actions will
leave just as many people as unhappy policy losers as state decisionmaking. Professor Williams is probably right that few people are
likely to select their home city or county based on local policies
concerning child custody or alimony after divorce. But views on these
policies could conceivably correlate with differences in jurisdictional
size and type (big city, small town, suburb, rural area); partisan
political preference; race or ethnic composition; socio-economic
status; or community lifestyle (“traditional values” evangelical vs.
hipster). If so, that is, if views on disputed family law issues correlate
with demographic or cultural differences, then the case for family law
localism is stronger. If, on the other hand, the different “rules of
thumb” adopted by different localities are likely to be more random,
the case for localism is weaker, turning on the idea that local
governments—unlike the gridlocked state—will actually take action
and that the ability to adopt local rules would be an incentive for local
political action.
Of course, we already have local decision-making on family law
issues—but by local judges, not city councils or county commissions.
Trial judges in thirty-four states are locally elected; the remainder are
appointed—usually by the governor based on the recommendation of

39. See Williams, supra note 1, at 1127-32.
40. Williams, supra note 1, at 1132.
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a judicial selection commission—to serve in local districts.41 In some
states, the appointed judges are subject to retention elections.42 As
Professor Ethan Leib has explained, these judges are part of and
reflect “a local legal culture.”43 Although part of the state judiciary,
they often see themselves as “in the business of using statutory law to
address and accommodate local needs and priorities.”44 When, as in
the family law setting, “state judicial and statutory or
pronouncements are ambiguous or vague,” local judges may already
be inclined to take a localist approach to contested issues.45 Professor
Leib defends such localist judging as long as the courts are staffed by
professional lawyers, are subject to direct supervision by the state
judiciary through appellate review, and are composed of elected
judges.46
But if the local election of state judges has already provided an
opening for localist family law, why add local legislatures to the
process? I think there are two arguments for adding the legislatures,
and two against. In favor of some form of modest local law-making,
such as the rules of thumb Professor Williams proposes, legislative
action would promote local level uniformity in family law and provide
greater democratic engagement with family law decision-making. Of
course, the arguments against are exactly the same.
With respect to uniformity, local legislative involvement could
increase uniformity of decision-making within a locality. If the city
council adopts a rule of thumb and all the judges elected or appointed
within that city follow it, there would be greater consistency and
predictability of local decisions within that locality—even if the
degree of variation within the state as a whole remains the same. On
the other hand, identifying a particular rule with particular places—
and potentially with particular ethnic groups, party affiliations, and
cultural commitments—could harden the divisions within a state and

41. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM,
Selection & Retention of State Judges: Methods from Across the Country
http://iaals.du.edu/quality-judges/publications/selection-retention-state-judgesmethods-across-country [https://perma.cc/X6B8-BQSF].
42. See, e.g., National Center for State Courts, Judicial Selection and Retention:
Resource Guide, http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Selection-andRetention/Resource-Guide.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BTJ5-JH4W].
43. Ethan Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 905
(2013).
44. Id. at 908.
45. Id. at 927.
46. Id. at 929.
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make approaches to family issues seem to turn on ineffable
“community values” and moral judgments rather than the product of
principled deliberation, and less subject to judicial review.47
Professor Williams optimistically suggests that multiple, varying local
rules will be followed by studies that generate a set of best practices
that will ultimately lead to state-level action.48 But it is also possible
that local rules will freeze divisions and stiffen the resistance of
people in one part of the state to rules associated with another.
The democratic case for local legislative involvement is also
straightforward. Although locally-elected judges have a democratic
pedigree, local councils have an even stronger claim to representing
community views and, especially, the diversity of views within the
community. Whereas trial court adjudication vests decision-making
authority in the hands of a single individual, legislative bodies have
plural membership, permitting disagreement and debate,49 and
encouraging engagement by the broader community. Even when
both local judges and local legislators are elected, the larger size of
the legislative body can enhance the representativeness and the
deliberativeness of the decision. On the other hand, given the
nonbinding nature of the proposed rules of thumb, local legislators
may be tempted to use the occasion of a debate on a question of
family law to posture and make public statements intended to please
a political audience rather than think through the implications of a
decision. This may be particularly likely if the issue involves an
emotional, “hot-button” question. When the legislature is not
responsible for the outcomes of actual cases, there may be a
temptation to act irresponsibly. Local rules of thumb may not be
exactly “cheap talk”—they could have political as well as legal
consequences50—but the lack of binding effect could make them an
occasion for not-fully-thought-through action.
This may be
particularly likely with respect to divorce-related issues that are the
subjects of intensive lobbying, which could occur when conflicting
members of the local matrimonial bar (say pro-husband vs. pro-wife)
push for different resolutions that could be helpful to them in specific

47. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 623, 634-54 (2014).
48. Williams, supra note 1, at 1127-30.
49. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633,
641-48 (1995).
50. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons of
Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 589-90 (2006) (holding soft law
measures are not necessarily cost-less “cheap talk”).
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cases, and use campaign contributions to bolster the appeal of their
positions.
Professor Williams’s proposal is, in a sense, a “vertical” solution to
what might be called a “horizontal” problem—the failure of state
legislatures to provide courts with appropriately detailed laws that
would result in more consistent resolution of disputed cases. There is
also arguably a vertical problem within the court system, with
appellate courts not providing proper guidance to trial courts. It is not
clear to me whether he believes that local legislative decision-making
is actually the better way to resolve family law questions, or whether
this is a second best solution to the failures of state-level institutions
put forward in the hope that the local resolutions of these issues will
be studied and provide a path toward state-level agreement.
Decentralization is appropriate when the reasons for failure to
resolve the problem at the higher level of government involve a deep
disagreement over policies or values within the larger community but
there is a greater degree of consensus on these issues within local
governments.
Decentralization also makes sense when the
differences in local needs, conditions or circumstances are so great
that the law ought to take them into account because state-wide rules
will not work well. It is unclear whether this describes the family law
setting.
These comments are not intended to disagree with Professor
Williams’s call for local legislatively-enacted rules of thumb. Greater
clarity and predictability in the law would be desirable, even if only at
the local level, and the rules of thumb could facilitate that. But I
doubt this will “revolutioniz[e] family law.”51 Local decision-makers
are already central to family law judgments. Local legislative
enactments might result in a more consistent, more democratically
legitimate expression of community sentiments on these issues, but
that could just as easily harden disagreements and inflame debates as
provide the path Professor Williams seeks toward greater state-level
rulification.

51. See Williams, supra note 1, at 1161.

